The court ruled that Bhim Singh had been unlawfully detained and denied Article 21, which allows citizens to go wherever they want without illegal recycling. As compensation, the court awarded him $50,000 in compensation. Despite its explanatory power, civil law theory is susceptible to a potentially serious objection – or it appears to make tort law vulnerable to such an objection. Since civil law theory offers little guidance on the appropriate type of remedy, it presents tort law primarily as an institution that allows one person to harm another person with the assistance of the coercive power of the state. The Damages Act can, of course, be such an institution. But if it is, it can be deeply flawed – in fact, it can be unfair. This problem can take the form of a dilemma. Either the principle of civil remedy is based on a principle of justice or it is not. If the principle of civil remedy is based on a principle of justice, then the theory of civil law threatens to collapse into a kind of theory of justice. If the principle of civil remedy is not so justified, then it seems to allow only one party to inflict harm on another.
If that is what the principle does, it is reasonable to ask whether it can justify a whole body of legislation or even make it consistent. The theory of civil recourse has considerable explanatory power. Perhaps most obviously, this explains why tort actions have a bilateral structure – why the victim of an unlawful injustice seeks redress from the perpetrator himself, rather than a shared pool of resources. It also explains why tort actions are brought in private – why the state does not act on its own initiative to impose liability on those who violate first-class obligations. According to the theory of civil remedy, the breach of a first-order obligation does not lead to a legal obligation, but to a legal power, a power that the victim does not wish to exercise. Simply put, violation of a person`s legal rights without real harm to wealth, health and individual comfort. Rather than focusing on categories of torts, it is more fruitful to first conceptualize tort liability in relation to the elements that a claimant must prove in order to obtain compensation. For example, a defendant commits a battery when acting with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff, and that contact is in fact the result of his action.
If an applicant meets the burden of proof for these elements, he or she has proven a prima facie case of assault. A defendant who commits such a defined battery may nevertheless escape liability by asserting a defence. For example, a defendant in an assault action could avoid liability by proving that he acted in self-defense or that the plaintiff consented to the otherwise unlawful touching. The meaning of this maxim is that « no action can result from an unlawful act ». Legal maxims are very concise about nature, these maxims are often used in law as a rule or basic principle and must be followed by society, legal maxims are necessarily used to avoid long definition. Certain legal maxims are often used in tort law and have been brought to light through cases. The most important factor in tort is that the person or plaintiff has suffered legal harm. Maxims are also widely used in tort, according to Salmond « tort is a civil tort, a remedy in a common law action for unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively a breach of contract or breach of trust or any other merely equitable obligation ». Many theorists believe that economic analysis offers a questionable interpretation of the legal obligation to behave reasonably. By characterizing negligence as the failure to take cost-justified precautions, economic analysis identifies an appropriate risk appetite with rational risk-taking. Economic analysis does ask us to determine what risks would be acceptable to a potential defendant if he assumes that he has both the resulting benefits and the resulting harms. This way of articulating the error standard treats the costs and benefits of an activity as equally important, regardless of where they are located.
But what I owe you may not be the same as what I owe to myself. In fact, it might be reasonable for me to care more about your well-being than mine, as we might think that I have the right to compromise on my own well-being to which I am not entitled in terms of your well-being.